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A New, Better BET: Rescuing and
Revising Basic Emotion Theory
Daniel D. Hutto* , Ian Robertson and Michael D. Kirchhoff
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia
Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades
(Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino
and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines
of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies
and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers,
leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016).
This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows that we have good reason
to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET’s commitment to affect
programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can
avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions.
Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised,
refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet.
Keywords: basic emotions, affect programs, affective science, embodiment, radical enactivism
“I don’t experience basic human emotions. It’s not my thing”
- Albert Brooks
INTRODUCTION
Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, conjectures that at least some emotions can be identified with or
otherwise instantiate biologically evolved, pan-cultural affect programs (Ekman, 1972; Griffiths,
1997; DeLancey, 2002).1 Understood as affect programs, basic emotions unfold, without conscious
attention or direction, in coordinated yet automatic, script-like patterns – where such patterns
manifest as a distinctive mosaic of physiological, autonomic, neural, behavioral, and expressive
organismic responses2.
Basic Emotion Theory has had a good run. It has been influential in shaping research in
the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Scarantino
and Griffiths, 2011). It has opened up new lines of research in psychology – on the detection
of facial expressions; in neuroimaging – on the neural correlates of basic emotions; and in
evolutionary psychology3. Nevertheless, philosophers have criticized BET on both methodological
1The defining characteristic of basic emotions, on this theory, is that they have evolved because of their adaptive value in
enabling organisms to navigate “fundamental life-tasks” (Ekman, 1992, p. 196; see also Griffiths, 1997).
2DeLancey (2002, p. 3) usefully characterizes BET’s driving assumption as a commitment to the idea that some emotions are
biologically based, pancultural syndromes, understood as “coordinated collections of complex biological responses that occur
together.”
3For example, a good deal of work has been devoted to investigating the neurobiological profile of the alleged basic emotions
(see Vytal and Hamann, 2010 for a review; see also Wager et al., 2015; Clark-Polner et al., 2016; Nummenmaa and Saarimäki,
2017; Saarimäki et al., 2018). Despite this, there is a respectable degree of caution in the field about whether and to what
extent neuroimaging evidence from, e.g., fMRI and PET studies, does or even could lend support to BET (Celeghin et al.,
2017; Caruana, 2017; McCaffrey, unpublished).
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and theoretical grounds. This has led to calls for BET to be
jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016).
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section “All BETs
Are Off!” outlines the objections that Colombetti (2014) and
Hufendiek (2016) raise against BET. These objections have
led them to recommend either avoiding BET or rejecting it
wholesale. Section “Is BET Really a Bad BET?” defuses the
criticisms leveled at BET by showing that they rest on drawing the
basic/non-basic distinction in just one possible way – which is not
the best motivated way to draw the distinction. Section “Reasons
to BET On BET” shows that, once that distinction is understood
in terms of non-basic emotions having an additional ingredient,
it is possible to provide a plausible account of how non-basic
emotions arise and how they relate to basic emotions. Finally,
Section “Adjusting our BET” shows that BET is not harmed by
its commitment to affect programs, since these need neither be
conceived of as brain-bound sets of instructions nor as inflexible,
hardwired, automatic, stimulus-response patterns. Rather than
leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised,
refashioned and rescued by appeal to a radically enactive view of
the emotions. All in all, we propose that our new, adjusted BET is
still a very good bet4.
ALL BETs ARE OFF!
Why bet against BET? In a critical review of the state of emotion
research, Colombetti (2014) identifies a series of objections
that have been leveled against BET. These include objections
that BET is to be avoided because it is: (1) refuted by cross-
cultural linguistic differences; (2) tainted by use of a flawed,
forced choice methodology in collecting evidence for pan-
cultural facial expressions; (3) incapable of accommodating
the context-sensitivity and openness of emotional episodes; (4)
unsupported by contemporary neuroimaging data (for full details
and discussion, see Colombetti, 2014, p. 29–36).
In the end, none of these concerns prove fatal. Indeed,
Colombetti (2014) does excellent work in exposing each of these
objections to be misguided or otherwise ineffectual. Nevertheless,
Colombetti (2014) and Hufendiek (2016) have identified other
problems with the distinction between basic and non-basic
emotions that these critics hold hit BET, and hit it hard. Indeed,
in betting against BET these authors take their complaints to be
4Others also aim to defend BET, but they propose to do so in a different way than we
do, and in response to different sorts of objections. Psychological constructionists,
such as Barrett (2006) and Barrett and Russell (2015), have argued that BET
is empirically unsound. They hold that neuroscientific and psychophysiological
data do not support the hypothesis of original BET that there are one-to-one
correspondences between specific emotion categories and profiles characteristic
of affect programs. They take this to empirically falsify BET. By way of reply,
Scarantino (2015, p. 344) has proposed revising and updating BET in a way
that acknowledges “the constructionist critique while preserving the notion that
basic emotions are specialized, evolved programs for dealing with fundamental life
tasks.” Evaluating whether such an approach succeeds in dealing with the criticisms
raised by constructionists falls beyond the scope of this paper. Our proposal for a
new, better BET has a different purpose – it seeks to demonstrate that there is a
logically coherent and empirically sound way to draw the basic emotion/non-basic
emotion distinction that avoids the philosophical objections described above. Our
aim is to clarify and defend BET, on philosophical grounds, in a way that has not
been done hitherto.
serious enough to constitute independently sufficient reasons for
steering clear of BET, if not for rejecting it outright.
Colombetti (2014) maintains that the most serious problem
with BET is that its prominence in affective science has led
researchers to the counterproductive conviction that emotions
divide into two distinct, mutually exclusive classes on the
assumption that basic and non-basic emotions can share no class-
defining properties in common. Fundamentally, BET has thereby
promoted belief in a distorting taxonomy according to which
some emotions are deemed to possess distinctive pan-cultural
response profiles while others are deemed to be entirely culture-
bound and lacking distinctive response profiles (Colombetti,
2014, p. 36).
How has this come about? On Colombetti’s (2014) analysis,
the belief that we have already identified some basic emotions
has given credence to the idea that BET’s basic/non-basic
emotion distinction is empirically well-established. That idea,
in turn, fuels blinkered research programs that perpetuate
the unfounded belief in the basic/non-basic distinction itself
because they spuriously focus on only a subset of emotions.
In effect, unprincipled decisions about which emotions should
be investigated as candidate basic emotions have made it seem,
illogically, as if we have evidence that only some emotions are
basic.
Ultimately, Colombetti (2014) traces the source of the trouble
to the influence of the seminal study by Ekman and Friesen
(1971) – a study that first helped launch BET into the limelight.
Ekman and Friesen (1971) sought to determine whether the
same facial expressions would be identified as displaying
the same emotions in both literate and non-literate cultures.
Their famous cross-cultural study of Westernized and non-
Westernized subjects revealed that both populations associated
a select set of facial patterns with a particular set of emotions,
namely: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, surprise, and sadness.
These findings have been widely taken to support the idea that the
links between some facial expressions and some emotions may
indeed be universal. These findings led, initially, to the conviction
that there are, at least, six basic emotions5.
Importantly, the process by which these six emotions made
the basic emotion short list was arbitrary. As Colombetti (2014,
p. 38) reminds us, the emotions in the Ekman and Friesen study
were not chosen “on the basis of a clear rationale.” In fact,
merely practical restrictions drove Ekman and Friesen (1971)
to focus on the six emotions they did, rather than a wider
array of candidates6. Basically, they choose the six emotions in
5We make no claim that Ekman and Friesen’s list definitively individuates six
distinct basic emotions, each of which is made manifest via a unique affect program
profile. Indeed, Ekman and Friesen (1971 p. 128) note that their participants
were seemingly unable to reliably distinguish between fear and surprise. This
would seemingly undermine the notion that Ekman and Friesen’s (1971) facial
recognition data grounds a distinction between fear and surprise as basic emotions.
6It is often argued that the BET research program should be expanded so as to take
into account a wider range of emotions. Keltner and Cordaro (2017), for example,
argue that the multimodal and highly intricate nature of emotional expression
lends support to the contention that there may be far more basic emotions than
Ekman and Friesen’s (1971) original big six. In his later writings Ekman (1999,
p. 194) was expressly open to this possibility: he proposed that “the list of basic
emotions and possible basic emotions is not a short one.”
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question because they could not obtain enough suitable sample
photographs to investigate a broader set. Naturally, deciding
which emotions are basic by such a selection process is clearly
arbitrary.
Colombetti (2014) acknowledges that Ekman and Friesen
(1971) never claimed or intended their list of six emotions to be a
principled or exhaustive list of the basic emotions. Nevertheless,
she takes it to be a bad consequence of the influence of their early
findings that emotion researchers have come to assume, rather
than empirically establish, that there is a distinctive class of basic
emotions. With respect to the arbitrariness of the list of candidate
basic emotions things have not improved. This is so, even though
the list of basic emotions waxes and wanes and need not be exactly
the same as the six identified in the Ekman and Friesen (1971)
study7.
Putting all of this together, the way BET has been taken up in
the field –precisely because of its great influence– is doing more
harm than good. In particular, Colombetti (2014) maintains that
BET is a self-perpetuating and distorting theoretical framework.
The assumption that some emotions are basic and others are
not has led to those deemed non-basic being less vigorously
studied. Worse, this has led to a dearth of evidence for assessing
whether emotions deemed non-basic are, in fact, non-basic.
For example, “the conviction that emotions such as jealousy,
shame, envy, love, and so on are not basic and thus do not
have distinctive manifestations has discouraged the study of
their neural, behavioral and bodily features” (Colombetti, 2014,
p. 40, see also Shaver et al., 1996). As such, she holds that
BET is not empirically well-established so much as widely
presupposed.
Notably, even those who do not embrace BET or who are
skeptical of it can still shape their research agendas in light of
it. Nor does it matter if BET’s progenitors decry this situation
or not. For, if Colombetti (2014, p. 37) is right, “BET has
acquired a life of its own, and the received view in affective
science today is that only some emotions are basic.” Her
reasoning is straightforward: Only an arbitrary sub-class –not
the full class– of emotions is systematically investigated to see
whether they qualify as basic. If so, then the supposition that
only some emotions are basic is empirically unfounded and has
irrationally restricted the focus of affective science. Because of
this assessment of BET, she maintains that affective scientists
7Others have made similar claims about the bad consequences of BET. Ortony
and Turner (1990, p. 315) observe that BET has resulted in widespread acceptance
“that there exists a small set of basic emotions.” Frijda and Parrott (2011, p. 207)
also contend that “the construct of basic emotions has promoted undesirable
consequences: a focus on a small subset of human emotions.” Celeghin et al. (2017,
p. 2) go further and describe BET as being committed to “a view that purports
the existence of a small number of so-called basic emotions.” In a tentative tone,
Hufendiek (2016) raises a similar worry about BET. She writes, “A methodological
problem with the postulation of basic emotions could be that there is a tendency in
the research literature to postulate a fixed set of basic emotions extrapolated from
one’s own research in a single field. This is exactly what Ekman does in postulating
that there are six affect programs because this fits with his finding that there are
six cross-culturally occurring facial expressions” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 68). Here,
Hufendiek uses the term affect program interchangeably with basic emotion, as
is typical in the BET literature. It should be stressed again that Ekman did not
postulate that there are a fixed set of basic emotions. He is open to the empirical
possibility that all emotions exhibit a basic profile (Ekman, 1999, p. 57).
should dispense with it and the notion of basic emotions
entirely8.
Hufendiek (2016) also rails against BET. She questions the
conceptual tenability and evidential basis of BET’s basic/non-
basic emotion distinction, as she construes it. Like Colombetti
(2014), she assumes that BET is committed to “the neat distinction
between basic emotions, which are evolutionarily acquired affect
programs, and higher cognitive emotions, which do not have
a unique pattern of bodily reactions... but presuppose higher
cognitive abilities” (p. 66, emphasis added).
Hufendiek takes Griffiths (1997) to be the official
spokesperson for BET on the question of the basic/non-
basic emotion distinction. This leads her to conclude that BET
is committed to the idea that “basic emotions form a natural
kind that was already present in our ancestors, [and that] higher
cognitive emotions should be seen as a distinct class” (Hufendiek,
2016, p. 65, emphasis added). Yet, though she does not state it
explicitly, her assumption is stronger. For, in formulating the
basic/non-basic emotion distinction Griffiths-style, any given
emotion must fall into one of two mutually exclusive, distinct
classes on the assumption that the two kinds of emotions can
share no properties in common.
Basic Emotion Theory is thus taken to subscribe to an anti-
essentialist position about non-basic emotions such that they are
“cognitive-based and culturally constructed phenomena, and not
natural kinds” (Caruana, 2017, p. 87). It is in this sense that
BET is purportedly driven to assume that non-basic emotions
are, as Hufendiek (2016, p.66) puts it, “without any roots in
. . . evolutionary history.” For this reason, emotions of these
different kinds are assumed to depend on entirely different sorts
of mechanisms. Non-basic emotions are marked out as lacking
the features of affect programs precisely because they have not
been evolutionary acquired. This is what allegedly makes non-
basic emotions “completely different from basic ones” (Caruana,
2017, p. 88).
Accordingly, if the preceding analysis is correct, BET embeds
a disunity thesis – one that firmly distinguishes basic from non-
basic emotions. Bearing all this in mind, Hufendiek’s (2016, p. 66)
argument against BET is based on her analysis that “there is no
reason for the radical distinction drawn by Griffiths.”
Her complaints on this score vary in content, scope and
strength. She tells us that dividing basic and non-basic emotions
into two distinct and opposing classes “does not make much
sense” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 67); or that at the very least such a
division is “much too strict” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 66). However,
she does not give any persuasive arguments about how much
sense the distinction actually makes or the degree of strictness
it enjoys. Rather, her true focus seems to be on whether it is
warranted at all and her predictions about its empirical scope and
applicability.
With respect to the question of warrant, she thinks the
basic/non-basic emotion distinction only looks attractive because
we fail to see the woods for the trees. She holds the distinction
is not justified because it reads too much into the evidence
8In her own words, “affective science would be better off dropping the notion of
basic emotions” (Colombetti, 2014, p. 26, p. 40).
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gleaned from a limited set of scientific findings. There is
positive data that she takes to supply evidential support for
the proposition “that all emotions, not simply basic emotions,
possess stereotypical physiological, behavioral, and expressive
characteristics” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 66, emphasis added). If
that were so, then all emotions would exhibit features of affect
programs.
What evidential support is there for such a conclusion?
Hufendiek (2016) provides instances in which purportedly
paradigmatic non-basic emotions exhibit affect program features.
She points to shame and pride as principal examples. She cites
a range of findings that are consistent with the possibility that
many paradigmatic non-basic emotions may, after all, have a
hardwired neurological profile (Fessler, 2004; Tracy and Robbins,
2004, 2007a,b; Beer, 2007; Tracy et al., 2013). Furthermore, she
speculates that “since research in this field is still very young . . .
we can expect similar evidence for many, if not all [non-basic]
emotions” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 66)9.
Putting all of this together, ultimately, she concludes that “a
strong case can . . . be made for the unity thesis that emotions
do belong to the same natural kind” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 66,
emphasis added). That, of course, would be to go too far. For
example, at this stage of the empirical game, it is only fair to
say that we do not know that shame and pride lack a “dedicated
neural circuitry” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 67). In line with this
more judicious reading of the evidence, in places Hufendiek
(2016) is more cautious and guarded. Sometimes her argument
against BET only amounts to the observation that the positive
evidence for an absolute basic/non-basic emotion distinction
is “pretty thin” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 67). Her more careful,
and credible, assessment is “that there might be basic forms
. . . for far more emotions” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 65, emphasis
added).
Empirically speaking, it seems that there is only one reasonable
answer to the question of whether the basic/non-basic emotion
distinction holds up: namely, it is “considerably too early to
conclude” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 67). In the end, this more careful
assessment of the sum total of the current empirical data cannot
support a recommendation, here-and-now, that affective science
is better off without the idea of basic emotions.
IS BET REALLY A BAD BET?
As we have just seen, some recommend getting rid of or at least
betting against BET (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). But
before we rush to judgment, we should ask: Do their arguments –
even when cast into their ideal, perfected forms– hold up?
Let us first return to Colombetti’s (2014) worries and start by
considering the factual question of whether or not the basic/non-
basic distinction actually has the pernicious, self-perpetuating
effects that she ascribes to it. Is it really the case that affective
science, impaired by BET’s distinction, has overly restricted the
scope of inquiries?
9For example, she predicts that “it is likely that evidence for other stereotypical
expressions of so-called higher cognitive emotions will be found” (Hufendiek,
2016, p. 66).
Nearly two decades ago, Shaver et al. (1996) anticipated
Colombetti’s (2014) observations about BET’s supposedly bad
effects. Using love as the principle example, they claimed that
the fact that the leading theorists of the day left love off their
lists of basic emotions resulted in a virtually loveless affective
science – one in which love received “less attention from emotion
researchers than its place in everyday life would lead one to
expect” (p. 3).
Perhaps love was a neglected target of investigation 20 years
ago. But even if this were so then, it would be hard to argue
that the same holds true of today’s affective science. For example,
Graham (2011) provides a meta-analysis of higher-order factors
underlying the most popular measures of love, reviewing 81
studies that analyze data from 103 samples and 19,387 individuals
(see also Ortique et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2011).
Or, consider the body of evidence that Hufendiek (2016)
cites in making her case against BET. Recall the range of
studies concerning pride and shame. Taken at face value, contra
Colombetti’s (2014) worry that BET is imposing a narrow focus
on the field, if anything, it seems that the actual trend appears to
be going in the opposite direction. Emotions that are canonically
non-basic, or at least which straddle the basic/non-basic line,
are being regularly investigated to see whether they exhibit basic
profiles.
Perhaps this is hardly surprising, for even as far back as
1992 (Ekman, 1992) disavowed that basic emotions need to be
restricted to a small sub-set. He openly entertained the possibility
that other emotions, some of which look decidedly non-basic –
contempt, shame, guilt embarrassment, and awe– might find
their way onto the basic list (Ekman, 1992, p. 192). Indeed,
Ekman (1999, p. 57) went so far as to allow that, in the end, it
might turn out all emotions are basic. Yet, if so, the basic/non-
basic distinction would collapse.
Affective scientists are beginning to actively explore this
possibility. In this regard, even Colombetti (2014, p. 40)
acknowledges that what she regards as a BET-induced negative
trend “is changing, although slowly.” Increasingly, emotion
scientists are going the right way – they are appropriately
widening their focus beyond an allegedly arbitrary subdivision
of emotions. And, if it that were not already the case, it could
and should be so. Either way, if there is any legitimate worry
about BET it can’t be that it has intrinsically and irredeemably
bad methodological effects on emotion research.
The true objection to BET must be –more in line with
Hufendiek (2016) – that once affective science widens its gaze it
will be discovered that BET is false. However, as already noted, at
this stage of the game that, of course, is just an empirical bet.
So, is this a bet that BET is, in fact, losing as each empirical
hand is revealed – as Hufendiek (2016) imagines? Is it the case –
to rehearse Hufendiek’s (2016, p. 66) reasoning once again– that
because “research in this field is still very young” we can expect
evidence that many, if not all, emotions have affect program
features? Let us assume that the evidence that canonical basic
emotions have basic profiles continues to amass. Indeed, let us
go further and assume –just as Hufendiek (2016) projects– that,
in the end, it turns out all so-called non-basic emotions have a
basic profile.
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In such a case would we have sufficient grounds for rejecting
BET? No. The reason is simple. To reject BET on these
grounds depends on characterizing its core distinction as a
distinction between two mutually exclusive classes of emotions
that have exactly contrasting properties which do not overlap,
as Colombetti (2014), Hufendiek (2016), and Caruana (2017)
assume BET does. As far as we are aware, nowhere do proponents
of BET insist on casting the basic/non-basic distinction in such
terms. Notably, BET advocates have little to say about the
positive characteristics of non-basic emotions, and tend only
to characterize them in terms their not being basic (see, e.g.,
Griffiths, 1997). Griffiths (2003) does better in speaking of non-
basic emotions as those that mediate social interactions and
which can figure in folk psychological narratives. As he repeatedly
emphasizes, it is emotions of this kind that are of particular
interest to philosophers. Yet, so construed, there is nothing about
non-basic emotions that would preclude them from sharing
many of the characteristic features of basic emotions.
Importantly, it would not matter even if BET advocates
did or do embrace the basic/non-basic emotion distinction in
the way its critics characterize that distinction – for nothing
would oblige defenders of BET to do so. Put otherwise, the
basic/non-basic emotion distinction need not be drawn in terms
of two kinds of emotions that have exactly contrasting, mutually
exclusive features. The distinction can be drawn in other, more
sophisticated ways – in ways that do not carve up the logical
space so that basic emotions, and only basic emotions, have an
evolutionary basis and exhibit distinctive affect program features.
Differentiating basic and non-basic categories will be viable
just in case there is a single identifiable feature that can be
ascribed to the one category but not to the other. For this reason,
it is possible to have a crisp, clean and clear distinction between
basic and non-basic emotions that does not preclude that a great
many of the features of basic and non-basic emotions might
overlap.
To see this point clearly, consider by way of analogy Coca-
Cola Classic and Coca-Cola Zero. Both are kinds of Coca-Cola
but they are not the same kind of Coca-Cola. Yet the two kinds
of Coca-Cola are basically the same; they share all the same
ingredients, in the same mix and portion, apart from sugar. Coca-
Cola Classic has sugar, while Coca-Cola Zero has none – hence it
has no calories. Thus, the two kinds of Coca-Cola can be cleanly
and clearly distinguished by testing for the presence or absence
of sugar; but testing them on the basis of any of their other,
overlapping features would not enable us to discern to which
kinds any particular instances belong.
There are major advantages of drawing the basic/non-
basic emotion distinction in terms of non-basic emotions
having an additional ingredient rather than mutually contrasting
properties. For example, it avoids committing BET to the
implausible idea that non-basic emotions must be “human-
specific higher cognitive reaction[s] without any roots in
the evolutionary history of other species” (Hufendiek, 2016,
p. 66). On the extra ingredient reading of the basic/non-
basic emotion distinction, BET can hold both that basic
emotions have homologues in other species, and their origins
in our phylogenetic ancestors, while also holding that non-basic
emotions possess such features. We agree with Hufendiek (2016,
p. 66) that it is plausible that non-basic emotions will have
“an evolutionary basis that only develops further and changes
or broadens its function in human life.” Yet that is perfectly
compatible with an extra-ingredient way of carving out the
basic/non-basic distinction.
We can now return to consider an idealized version of
Hufendiek’s (2016) argument against BET. What if investigation
into the emotions should reveal — as Hufendiek (2016, p. 67)
anticipates — that there are “only very vague and gradual”
features to differentiate between basic and non-basic emotions?
Would emotion researchers need to reject the basic and non-basic
distinction and instead embrace only a “differentiated theory of
emotions” (Hufendiek, 2016, p. 68)? In such a case, wouldn’t
affective science be better off classifying emotions “along a
gradual spectrum, where some might be evolutionarily older, or
more hardwired, or less sensitive to social context than others”
(Hufendiek, 2016, p. 68)?
Not necessarily. Certainly, there is no forced choice here.
Just because we can order emotions along a continuum – of,
say, their evolutionary age, or susceptibility to change under
social influences – does not preclude our drawing a firm and
scientifically tractable distinction between basic and non-basic
emotions.
In sum, the fundamental error with Colombetti’s (2014) and
Hufendiek’s (2016) arguments, even in their idealized forms, is
that both assume that BET is or must be committed to the idea
that for any characteristic feature of basic emotions, a non-basic
emotion will have the correspondingly opposite features. Yet, to
echo Colombetti (2014), there is ‘no clear rationale’ for thinking
that BET has only one way to carve out the basic/non-basic
distinction. What is truly ‘arbitrary’ is to assume that there is
only one possible characterisation of that distinction that could
capture ‘the’ distinction that BET requires.
If this analysis is correct, then, pace Hufendiek, even if all
emotions turn out to have affect program features, this would
not suffice to show the basic/non-basic emotion distinction to be
otiose or misguided. It would not show that the basic/non-basic
emotion distinction is problematic, too strict or conceptually
unsound. It would only show that we need to draw that
distinction in a different way.
REASONS TO BET ON BET
If the defanging and defusing efforts of the previous section
succeed, then BET – as construed under the extra-ingredient
rendering of the basic/non-basic distinction – may well still be
a good bet. Is it?
Do any independent reasons motivate adopting the extra-
ingredient account of non-basic emotions? Yes. Philosophers
have long argued that emotions should be identified with certain
kinds of contentful attitudes. This is because they hold that
contents play defining and individuating roles that determine if
an emotion is in play and which emotion is in play. Moreover,
emotions have a normative dimension that can only be accounted
for if they are assumed to be some kind of contentful attitude.
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According to this content-based view of the emotions, having
certain feelings of a characteristic sort do not suffice for having an
emotion. Consider a case in which you feel insulted by a perceived
slight. That feeling only suffices for your being emotionally upset,
say angry, as long as you believe that you have been insulted. If
that same feeling were to persist after you discover, and come to
believe, that you were not insulted, then ascribing anger to you
would no longer make sense. The feeling would not connect with
the rest of your contentful attitudes in the right way. Hence, it
would not count as an emotion at all.
Emotions so conceived are assumed to be or necessarily
involve content-bearing attitudes of some kind. Thus, emotions
are thought to be or embed contentful attitudes – it is their
content that makes them, by their very nature, “rationally
assessable and reason-sensitive” (Morag, 2016, p. 152). Emotions
proper, so the familiar story goes, must have appropriate kinds of
contents – be they contentful appraisals, evaluations, construals
or judgments – if they are to stand in the right kinds of
normatively constrained relations to other contentful attitudes10.
On this sort of content-based view of the emotions, something
qualifies as an emotion only if it has the appropriate content. This
has an unfortunate consequence if we stick with the policy of
distinguishing basic and non-basic emotions in terms of mutually
exclusive properties. For if it were assumed that affect programs
lack contentful properties then emotions that fall into the so-
called basic emotions won’t count as emotions at all.
On the content-based view of emotions, having content is the
essential ingredient, not just an extra ingredient. There is an exact
parallel with the way some people view Coca-Cola Classic and
Coca-Cola Zero. They regard only the former to be a kind of
Coca-Cola. Similarly, proponents of the content-based view of
emotion hold that any so-called emotion that lacks content just
isn’t the real thing. Following Griffiths (2003), let’s call this view
the Philosopher’s Favorite.
That is one way to go. Another would be to press for the
opposite conclusion – holding that so-called basic emotions are
the only real emotions. One might be inclined to such a view,
because, say, on scientific grounds we think that only basic
emotions pick out a natural kind (Griffiths, 1997). Calling on our
analogy once again, that would be parallel to insisting that the
only real Coca-Cola is Coca-Cola Zero, because, say, it is more
elemental and chemically fundamental. Let’s call this view the
Scientist’s Favorite.
It would be a tough business to decide between such warring
Philosophical and Scientific criteria. But, thankfully, we needn’t
try. We can reasonably doubt the extreme view that emotions are,
as a class, always and everywhere defined by, and thus necessarily
entail, content. Yet we can also accept that basic emotions pick
out real emotions without veering to the opposite extreme of
denying the existence of non-basic emotions with contentful
characters, or denying that their contents partly define such
emotions.
10The attitudes might be thought to be explicitly formed propositional attitudes,
such as beliefs or judgments. Or they might be thought to be some other kind of
pre-reflective, implicit contentful attitudes (for a detailed discussion of this point
see Morag, 2016, p. 31 ff.).
The point is that we have reason to take a modestly
pitched extra-ingredient account of the basic/non-basic emotion
distinction seriously if it is assumed that at least some emotions
have a contentful character that cannot be accounted for in terms
of their affect program features. Crucially, the extra-ingredient
rendering of the basic/non-basic distinction allows us to walk a
middle path between two less plausible, more extreme views of
the emotions – those that in different ways propose collapsing all
of their essential features into a single set.
So far, so good. Yet, by admitting that some emotions have
an extra ingredient that distinguishes them from other emotions,
we are obliged to explain how that extra ingredient is acquired
and how we should think about how basic and non-basic aspects
relate in cases of emotions that have both elements.
Colombetti (2014) cites the failure of existing accounts of this
relation as “another reason to drop the notion of basic emotions”
(p. 46, see also Ortony and Turner, 1990). She is surely right that
giving up the distinction would spare us the trouble of having to
develop a better, alternative account. As she puts it: “Getting rid
of the notion of basic emotions would also eliminate the need
to explain how alleged basic emotions relate to non-basic ones”
(p. 40). We concur that the standard options are inadequate,
especially if the aim is to account for the contentful dimension
of emotions. But, as we shall show, the sorts of accounts she
considers do not exhaust all available options.
The most familiar accounts of how basic emotions might
relate to non-basic emotions and might potentially explain
their emergence are building block and blending theories. The
common denominator in both of these kinds of theories is the
assumption that non-basic emotions are somehow comprised of,
or constructed out of, basic emotions. A blending theory, the
more popular of the two types of theory, imagines basic emotions
to be like primary colors, forming a kind of emotion palette
from which to form non-basic emotions (Plutchik, 2001). In the
simplest versions, such a theory might tell us that awe is a mix
of fear and surprise; that guilt is a mix of joy and fear; that
love is a mix of joy and acceptance. Colombetti (2014) worries
that in general non-basic emotions require something more than
mere mixtures of basic emotions. She gives examples of emotions
that require having certain kinds of thoughts –such as love
and guilt– that reveal pure blending theories to be insufficient
(see Colombetti, 2014, p. 42). The same worry applies, mutatis
mutandis, to building block theories. By these lights, an extra
ingredient is needed if we are to get non-basic emotions from
basic ones – an ingredient that cannot be accounted for by either
pure building block or blending theories.
On this analysis, neither pure building block nor blending
theories of basic emotions suffice – neither have credible
resources to explain how, through their mere combination,
contentless emotions can generate contentful emotions. Prinz
(2004) advances an impure, more complex version of blending
theory – adding a crucial extra dimension to his explanation.
He proposes that basic emotions may need to be calibrated with
other, culturally-sourced cognitive states that are not emotions in
order for there to be non-basic emotions. He gives the example
of schadenfreude, which he proposes is a feeling of joy triggered
by the thought of someone suffering (Prinz, 2004, p. 147–148).
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Crucially, schadenfreude is not, for Prinz (2004), merely a blend
of the feeling of joy and the additional thought that someone
is suffering. Rather on his model, schadenfreude is a feeling
of joy that has been triggered in a special way – by being
filtered through contentful attitudes – and is thus calibrated
with someone’s suffering. Accordingly, cognitive contributions,
beyond those that can be provided by building or blending
base emotional elements, are necessary for having non-basic
emotions.
Prima facie, a calibration theory of this sort looks more
promising than its purist rivals. However, it cannot fully
explain how non-basic emotions arise from basic ones unless
it adequately explains – rather than simply presupposes – the
genesis of the culturally sourced, cognitive contents that it
relies on to do the relevant, additional work. Arguably, existing
accounts fall short on just this requirement. For example,
both Prinz (2004) and Hufendiek (2016) rely on classical
teleosemantic theories to account for the contents that they
assume feature in emotional episodes. Classical teleosemantic
theories of content seek to explain representational contents in
terms of biological functions (Millikan, 1984, 2005; Papineau,
1987). Yet, though promising, all such theories face well-known,
crippling problems – principally, it is argued that there is “a root
mismatch between representational error and failure of biological
function” (Burge, 2010, p. 301, for a full discussion see Hutto and
Myin, 2013, Ch. 4, Hutto and Myin, 2017).
Luckily, there is another way to explain the natural origins of
the contents that are needed to augment basic emotions such that
there can be non-basic emotions. Attempts are underway to try
to explain how contentful forms of cognition first came on the
scene, in phylogeny, and now come on the scene, in ontogeny,
by appeal to socio-cultural scaffolding (Hutto and Satne, 2015). If
this proves possible then a complete story can be told, without
gaps, of how we move from basic to non-basic emotions and
how these might inter-relate (Hutto and Myin, 2017). To tell
this story in detail would involve specifying how basic emotional
episodes come to inspire and feature in “complex emotional
episodes that figure in folk-psychological narratives about mental
life” (Griffiths, 2003; see also Goldie, 2000, 2003, 2012; Hutto,
2008).
A virtue of this the socio-cultural scaffolding theory is that
it accounts for the extra ingredient – the content– needed for
there to be non-basic emotions in a way that pure building block
and blending theories cannot. Beyond that, this duplex account
of emotions allows for non-basic emotions to have basic roots in
phylogenetic, ontogenetic histories – roots that serve as platforms
that explain how the emotion-relevant concepts and contents
needed for non-basic emotions arise.
ADJUSTING OUR BET
For all we’ve said, some readers may harbor some residual
concerns about understanding basic emotions in terms of affect
programs. To think of basic emotions as affect programs is to
regard them as evolutionary adaptations that are involuntarily
and automatically triggered and which result in a sequence of
responses – these patterns are what exhibit the characteristic
profile for each basic emotion (Ekman, 1992; Griffiths, 2004).
Does thinking of basic emotions as affect programs also
imply that they are necessarily brain-bound, going against the
burgeoning 4E trend in cognitive science (see, e.g. Newen et al.,
2018)? A number of expositors of BET certainly present it as
if it is committed to the idea that affect programs are neurally
housed. Caruana (2017, p. 87) holds that proponents of BET
“argue that emotions are discrete mental entities localized in the
brain in the form of affect programs.” Colombetti (2014) thinks
of BET’s basic emotions as products of “genetically determined
sets of instructions called affect programs which once activated
generated a series of distinctive changes” (p. 26, emphasis
original). And, with reference to his 2003 book, Hufendiek (2016)
tells us that “Ekman . . . claims that affect programs are literally
inscribed into our neural circuits” (p. 68, emphasis added).
We find no need for BET to make such a commitment
to brainbound programs. Nothing in the very idea of affect
programs entails such brainboundedness. Indeed, if anything,
official statements about BET only make much weaker claims
about the brain’s involvement in affect programs11. To quote
Ekman (2003) at length:
Affect programs are, like the emotion databases, a
metaphor, for I do not think there is anything like a
computer program sitting in the brain, nor do I mean to
imply that only one area of the brain directs emotion. We
know already that many areas of the brain are involved
in generating emotional behavior, but until we learn more
about the brain and emotion, a metaphor can serve us well
in understanding our emotions (p. 66, emphases added).
In any case, even if some proponents of BET do think of affect
programs as brain-bound sets of instructions, they needn’t do
so12. There is nothing in the very idea of BET that necessitates
such a claim. Thus we need not dispense with BET or the idea
of affect programs in order to view emotions as “dynamically
organized patterns that are realized by the whole organism”
(Hufendiek, 2016, p. 69). We can do this, for example, by
updating our understanding of an affect program, incorporating
it within a radical enactivist account of emotion. This would be,
11Some theorists, however, do make stronger and more metaphysically committed
claims about affect programs. For example, Tomkins (1962/2008) thought of an
affect program as “a subcortical structure which can instruct and control a variety
of muscles and glands to respond with unique patterns of rate and duration of
activity characteristic of a given affect” p. 135).
12Although Ekman clearly rejects the idea that affect programs are literally
neuronally instantiated computer programs, it is unclear whether he takes
the realization base of basic emotions to be exclusively neural. Ekman (1992)
claimed that “it is necessary to posit emotion-specific central nervous system
(CNS) activity in my account of basic emotions. The distinctive features of
each emotion, including the changes not just in expression but in memories,
imagery, expectations and other cognitive activities, could not occur without CNS
organization and direction” (Ekman, 1992, p. 182). This statement is neutral on
the question of whether the extra-neural aspects of the CNS are thought to play a
constitutive or a merely causal role in the realization of basic emotions. Enactivists
do not fence sit on this matter: they characterize emotions as realized not just in the
brain but across the brain, body and world though dynamical processes comprising
organismic engagements with environmental features of specific situations (Hutto,
2012).
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as Caruana (2017, p. 100) recognizes, to offer an account of basic
emotions that emphasizes not the body as such but the acting
body; one that portrays emotional episodes as enacted. Basic
emotions can thus be understood under the auspices of a radical
enactivism that emphasizes the full-bodied, active capacities of
living organisms in the generation of affective phenomena (see
Hutto, 2012).
Still, there may be a lingering worry. Wouldn’t construing
affect programs by the lights of radical enactivism lead us into
the arms of an unworkable behaviorism?
This is a general, much-voiced worry about radical
enactivism – or indeed, any non-representational account
of cognition. With direct reference to radical enactivism, O’Brien
and Opie (2015) put the worry this way:
there is a fundamental problem with the idea of contentless
intentionality: it’s been tried before, and it doesn’t work.
Back then the scheme was known as ‘behaviorism,’ rather
than ‘targeted directedness,’ but the two ideas are of a
piece. Behaviorists sought to explain animal behavior,
including all the complexities of human problem solving
and language, in terms of the history of stimulus–response
events to which organisms (of each kind) are typically
exposed. The bankruptcy of this approach consists in
the fact that moment-by-moment stimuli are simply too
impoverished to account for the richness, variety, and
specificity of the behaviors that animals exhibit. It just
isn’t possible to explain the ability of evolved creatures
to selectively engage with features of the environment—
in other words, engage in targeted behavior—without
supposing they employ internal states that in some way
represent those features (p. 724, see also Adams, 2018,
p. 23).
Employing this logic, if affect programs are not brain-bound
representational-cum-computational instructions, or driven by
such, then we have no choice but to understand them only using
the resources of stimulus-response behaviorism.
Applied to the question of basic emotions, the worry
is that radical enactivism, in negatively eschewing mental
representations, offers nothing by way of positive explanatory
resources other than those offered by a crude behaviorism13.
Hufendiek (2016) makes this specific version of the objection
explicit, proposing that our preferred non-representationalist
enactivist theory of emotion is:
subject to the most basic objection that cognitivism has
brought forward, that a characterization of emotions as
mere bodily reactions and behaviors completely misses the
normative dimension of emotions. Fear reactions are not
just automatic responses to a given stimulus. They are
reactions that can be adequate or inadequate depending on
13Notably, some have argued that the kind of unworkably crude behaviorism that
critics, such as O’Brien and Opie (2015), Hufendeik (2016), and Adams (2018),
have in mind does not accurately depict actual historical versions of behaviorism.
Rather it is deemed to be a straw position - a familiar but misleading caricature of
real behaviorism (see Barrett, 2016).
whether the situation in question is really dangerous or not
(Hufendiek, 2016, p. 96, emphases added).
Driving home the point, Hufendiek (2016) offers the following
illustration:
If we try to characterize fear as a reaction that is reliably
caused by the presence of certain dangerous stimuli that
under normal conditions cause typical bodily reactions
(such as the heart beating faster, adrenaline being released,
and so on) and finally think of the whole process as a
mechanism created by evolution, we end up with a crude
and simplistic behaviorist model of emotions (Hufendiek,
2016, p. 96).
Pace Hufendiek, radical enactivism isn’t just a different label
for a crude stimulus-response behaviorism14. Perhaps the easiest
way to see this is to note that radical enactivism embraces a notion
of embodied activity that does not reduce to the behaviorist
notion of a response to a stimulus. What’s the difference?
Importantly, as Jacob (2015) observes, enactivists break with the
behaviorism in setting their face against the idea that embodied
activity should be understood as any kind of simple output in
reply to an input. Indeed, enactivists typically reject the input-
output model of mind outright (see, Villalobos and Dewhurst,
2017a,b).
In promoting the idea that mentality is fundamentally wide
reaching and dynamical in character, radical enactivists abandon
both the linearity and instrumentality assumptions that exemplify
the vision of mind promoted by their behaviorist and cognitivist
rivals. The linearity assumption holds that cognitive processes
follow a standard sequence: “information flows from the outside
world in, through the sensory systems to perception, cognition,
the motor system, and then out again into the world” (Jacob,
2015, p. 227). The instrumentality assumption holds that action
stands in a means-end, as opposed to constitutive, relation to
cognition: cognition is the means by which actions are produced
or generated.
Crude behaviorism, like radical enactivism, rejects the
instrumentality assumption. However, radical enactivism
fundamentally disagrees with any behaviorism that subscribes
to the linearity assumption. Radical enactivists certainly do not
think that the embodied activity which they take to constitute
basic emoting reduces to responses that are triggered by a specific
stimulus and which unfold in a mechanical, script-like way.
The cornerstone, big idea of radical enactivism upon which
its other positive proposals about basic and non-basic minds
rest is that “the embodied activity of living beings provides the
right model for understanding minds” (Hutto and Myin, 2013,
p. 4)15. Pivotially, radical enactivism focuses on living creatures
14Even Westra (2018, p. 1) acknowledges that, “Despite its anti-representationalist
bent, REC is not wholly behaviouristic.”
15Bearing this in mind, it is odd that Baggs (2017) criticizes radical enactivism
for advancing a purely negative, representation-bashing agenda. By his lights,
radical enactivism only takes and never gives: It allegedly lacks a core set of
ideas around which a positive project could be built. Baggs’s (2017, p. 2) failure
to notice radical enactivism’s commitment to the life/mind model may in part
explain why he finds it “hard to imagine how it could be translated into a
positive empirical program.” Thompson (2018) echoes this sentiment, arguing
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and systems not dead mechanisms when it comes to modeling
and understanding minds (see also Kirchhoff and Robertson,
2018)16.
For this reason, the notion of embodied responsiveness that
radical enactivism promotes cannot be adequately understood
in terms of simple, blind mechanisms that are incapable of any
kind of novel adjustment to circumstance. The kind of embodied
activity that enactivists think typifies basic emoting therefore does
not subscribe to an empiricism or associationism that conceives
of habits “atomistically and as automatisms” (Barandiaran and
Di Paolo, 2014, p. 1). Radical enactivists thus ally themselves
to what Barandiaran and Di Paolo (2014) dub organicism – an
idea that denotes a more venerable trend of thought about the
nature of embodied activity and habits. It is an idea that has
yet to be, “taken up by mainstream cognitive neuroscience and
psychology. Habits, in this tradition, are seen as ecological, self-
organizing structures that relate to a web of predispositions and
plastic dependencies both in the agent and in the environment”
(Barandiaran and Di Paolo, p. 1).
Crucially, in modeling minds on living systems and not
inanimate mechanisms, enactivists propose to enliven our
picture of embodied habits—proposing that even in the absence
of cognitive contents our responsiveness is not lifeless and
mechanical. Accordingly, it regards all forms of cognition –even
the most basic variety– as precariously open to the particulars
of situations and, hence, capable of novelty. Radical enactivism
characterizes embodied activity that constitutes basic cognition
as a kind of context-sensitive responsiveness which is flexible
and open to the unique features of situations. It does not
understand such mentality in terms of slavishly scripted, reflex-
like responses to a stimuli, executed by blind or automatic
mechanisms.
Why does this matter? It exposes that the dilemma Hufendiek
(2016) poses for radical enactivism presents us not with a
terrible, inevitable choice but a false choice. It is demanded
that we either accept cognitivism or embrace an unworkable
behaviorism. We must either accept that cognition is a matter
of contentfully representing and modeling the world –namely,
that there is ‘intel inside’ driving embodied activity that qualifies
as cognitive– or be condemned to explaining mindedness in
terms of inflexible automatic reflexes that are thoughtless,
blind, unthinking, mechanical, script-like and lacking in all
novelty.
To see why Hufendiek’s choice is in fact a false choice, it helps
to give attention to infamous story of the Sphex wasp and the way
that a successful enactivism should concern itself with basic theoretical and
empirical questions and use these “to motivate the careful construction of a positive
theoretical framework with testable models”. As a criticism of radical enactivism,
the complaint that the framework offers nothing positive is ironic given that
foundationally both autopoietic and radical enactivism “emphasize the importance
of active, embodied, environmentally situated engagements for our understanding
of organisms and their mentality; and both view understanding developmental
processes as necessary to the understanding of life and mind” (Kee, 2018, p. 6).
Where the two enactivisms part company is over the question of whether sense-
making is an indispensable and theoretically important construct (see Kee, 2018
and also Barandiaran, 2017 for discussions of this point).
16Radical enactivism is studiously neutral with respect to strong metaphysical
claims that are often associated with other forms of enactivism such as, the
life/mind deep continuity thesis as defended by Kirchhoff and Froese (2017).
that story has been used in the cognitive sciences. This is the story
of Sphex, as told by Wooldridge (1963):
When the time comes for egg laying, the wasp Sphex builds
a burrow for the purpose and seeks a cricket which she
stings in such a way as to paralyze but not kill it. She drags
the cricket into the burrow, lays her eggs alongside, closes
the burrow, then flies away, never to return. In due course,
the eggs hatch and the wasp grubs feed off the paralyzed
cricket, which has not decayed, having been kept in the
wasp equivalent of a deepfreeze. To the human mind, such
an elaborately organized and seemingly purposeful routine
conveys a convincing flavor of logic and thoughtfulness—
until more details are examined. For example, the wasp’s
routine is to bring the paralyzed cricket to the burrow,
leave it on the threshold, go inside to see that all is well,
emerge, and then drag the cricket in. If, while the wasp
is inside making her preliminary inspection, the cricket is
moved a few inches away, the wasp, on emerging from the
burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not
inside, and will then repeat the preparatory procedure of
entering the burrow to see that everything is all right. If
again the cricket is removed a few inches while the wasp
is inside, once again the wasp will move the cricket up to
the threshold and re-enter the burrow for a final check. The
wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket straight in. On one
occasion this procedure was repeated 40 times, always with
the same result (pp. 82–83).
Keijzer (2012) provides a detailed and highly revealing analysis
of this oft-repeated Sphex narrative, showing its illicit use in
promoting the view that these wasps –and, by association, insects
more generally– never modify their routine behavior. The story
of Sphex has worked to convince many of the primary message
that “insect intelligence is very basic and mechanical” (Keijzer,
2012, p. 504).
The Sphex story has done much to promote the idea that a
basic mind simply equates to a blind mechanism. By such lights,
basic minds are precisely the sort of minds that can be adequately
accounted for in stimulus-response terms, or by positing simple
computational devices, those that generate a strict and rigid
sequence of outputs in response to triggering inputs17.
Importantly, the simple, diverting power of characterizing
Sphex as inflexible mechanism flies in the face of the empirical
facts about the nature of its waspish intelligence. These facts,
though debated, have been known for some time. Indeed, to
some extent they appear to have been known from the start,
even though a great deal of further research was required
in order for a truly balanced account of the details to
emerge.
Over time, questions have been raised about whether all
species of Sphex wasp, let alone all insects, are really condemned
to behavioral fixity. Ethologists have long investigated to what
17Keijzer (2012, p. 507) observes that thinking of basic minds or intelligence in
this way leant itself to “a new type of reader, those working in fields like control
theory, engineering neural circuits, and what eventually became the cognitive and
computational neurosciences.”
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extent the repertoires of such creatures admit of some degree of
behavioral variability.
As things stand now, the facts of the matter present us with
an interesting and complicated picture: the behavior of Sphex
wasps and other insects is mixed and equivocal. Their behavior
is neither slavishly fixed nor entirely variable – it’s a bit of both.
How these animals behave depends on many factors, including
the species of wasp in question and their particular habitat.
It turns out that details of their embodiment, situation and
circumstances matter. In the end, the correct answer appears to
be that, “these wasps can initiate new kinds of behavior under the
proper circumstance” (Keijzer, 2012, p. 414)
The parable of Sphex is important because it highlights
two things. Firstly, it beautifully illustrates the advantage of
characterizing basic minds in radical enactivist terms, where such
minds are modeled on living systems and not dead mechanisms.
For the aforementioned reasons, doing so enables us to attend
better to the full set and true character of the empirical
findings. Thus, adopting an enactivist perspective allows us
to better capture the nature of phenomena under scrutiny
than does using the theoretical machinery of its mechanistic
rivals.
Secondly, we should learn from the story about how the Sphex
story has been used, or rather misused, in the philosophy and
sciences of the mind. What is deeply concerning is “the endless
repetition of humans retelling the story as a matter of significance
despite all the available counterevidence” (Keijzer, 2012, p. 515,
emphasis added). The use of the Sphex case in the field offers up
a salient methodological moral. The whole affair gives us pause to
reflect: “One may wonder here whether cognitive issues should
be settled by finding proper examples that fit existing theories, or
whether theories should be developed that deal adequately and
systematically with the findings that nature provides” (Keijzer,
2012, p. 516).
This is a reminder that philosophers may be better served to
operate with a policy of looking first before rushing to theorize
(Hutto and Satne, 2017, 2018). Such an approach enables us
to come at the empirical data in a new and better ways before
making any attempt try to craft explanations or test specific
hypotheses. This is important because the explanatory adequacy
of any theory or hypothesis – our explanation of the facts – will
in large part hinge on the empirical adequacy of how we frame or
describe those facts, as the Sphex story so clearly illustrates.
In general, we might be suspicious of the idea that
philosophers are in the first-order business of producing scientific
theories and explanations in any case. Philosophical frameworks
are not scientific theories. Nor do they immediately generate
testable models, even if they are answerable to empirical findings
and can inspire and help to direct productive programs of
empirical research.
Functionalism, as its father Putnam told us back in
1967, principally amounts to “the putting forward, not of
detailed scientifically ‘finished’ hypotheses, but of schemata for
hypotheses” (Putnam, 1967/1992, p. 54). More recently, in
reflecting on the extended mind thesis, Clark (2011) reminds us
that some important philosophical issues are unlikely to admit
of straightforward scientific resolution even though they are
“scientifically important, and able to be scientifically informed”
(Clark, 2011, p. 454).
We have so far shown that radical enactivism does not reduce
to a crude behaviorism. It has richer resources than the latter
and offers a very different account of BET’s affect programs than
does its mechanistic rivals. Even so it may be thought that there
is still a crippling problem with our preferred account of basic
emotions – one that cannot be so easily addressed. In nutshell,
the worry is this: because radical enactivism gives up on the idea
of contentful mental representations its take on basic emotions
is unable to account for their normative dimension. How, so
the familiar objection goes, can an account of the emotions that
eschews representationalism and the idea that basic emotions are
contentful possibly account for or accommodate their normative
aspects?
We do not deny that basic emotions exhibit a kind of
normativity. Yet before trying to explain how this can be so on
a radically enactive account we need to get clearer about what
kind of normativity basic emotions actually exhibit. To do that
we need to get beyond the familiar philosophical penchant for
over-intellectualizing any phenomenon under scrutiny18.
Following Moran (2002/2017), we can take loving and caring
to be exemplars of basic emotions and understand them as
“essentially active responses to something else, and answerable to
the specific norms of that something else” (p. 153). Such norms
are objective, they are not up to the individual. Speaking of the
norms of pleasure, for example, Moran (2002/2017) explicates
this point by reminding us that “idly stroking some surface will
determine that only some activities and only some surfaces will be
possible providers of just those pleasures” (p. 153). Hence, there
are conditions of satisfaction for such norm-guided activity but,
crucially, those conditions need not be contentfully represented,
as intellectualism would have it.
Moran (2002/2017) defends this brand of anti-intellectualism
by saying: “None of this is to say that all these different types
of response should be seen as simply forms of judgments”
(p. 153). Few today would defend the view that basic emotions
are judgments, stricto sensu. Many are however inclined to think
they must be representational in some sense, ala Hufendiek, if
we are to account for their normative dimension. Yet, if we
follow Moran’s logic, there is no reason to think basic emotional
responses need to involve contentful mental representation of
any sort. It is easy to see why if we consider that contentful mental
representations are just the analog, or replacement notion, for
explicit judgments – differing only in that they are implicit and
out of sight, operating at the so-called sub-personal level. The
pivotal point is that if contentful judgments are superfluous
for doing the required explanatory work and hence otiose for
understanding the kind of normativity that basic emotions
exhibit, then contentful mental representations are superfluous
and otiose for the very same reason.
In sum, it appears it is possible to adjust and update our
understanding of affect programs in radical enactivist terms
18As Moran (2002/2017) says, “the philosopher’s occupational tendency is to
‘intellectualize’ anything he can bring himself to take seriously in human life, to
treat all internal conflicts as conflicts of judgments” (p. 149).
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without embracing either cognitivism or behaviorism. In doing
so, we propose a new better BET. This new BET, we think, is a
pretty good bet.
CONCLUSION
By clarifying the possible ways of drawing the basic/non-basic
emotion distinction, we have defended BET by defusing some
allegedly crippling objections against it. We have shown why
those objections fail, even when they are advanced in their ideal
forms. We have also shown that there is a plausible way to
understand how basic emotions might give rise to, and relate
to, non-basic emotions – once we conceive of the basic/non-
basic emotion distinction as one in which non-basic emotions
are distinguished by an extra ingredient. Finally, we have shown
that the affect programs that BET relies on can, in principle, be
understood through the lens of a radical enactivism, such that
they need not be conceived of as brain-bound instructions nor
mere stimulus-response patterns.
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